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Abstract
WPA2 Enterprise is a fundamental technology for secure communica-
tion in enterprise wireless networks. A key requirement of this technology
is that WiFi-enabled devices (i.e., supplicants) be correctly configured be-
fore connecting to the enterprise wireless network. Supplicants that are
not configured correctly may fall prey of attacks aimed at stealing the
network credentials very easily. Such credentials have an enormous value
because they usually unlock access to all enterprise services.
In this work we investigate whether users and technicians are aware
of these important and widespread risks. We conducted two extensive
analyses: a survey among approximately 1000 users about how they con-
figured their WiFi devices for enterprise network access; and, a review of
approximately 310 network configuration guides made available by enter-
prise network administrators. The results provide strong indications that
the key requirement of WPA2 Enterprise is violated systematically and
thus can no longer be considered realistic.
1 Introduction
Secure WiFi access is a fundamental component of every enterprise. This tech-
nology is based on the WPA2 Enterprise family of protocols and ensures that
only authenticated devices may connect to an enterprise wireless network: each
user has personalized credentials and devices may connect only after presenting
valid credentials of a user [10]. After successful authentication, the wireless traf-
fic between the device (supplicant in WPA2 Enterprise parlance) and the access
point occurs with strong security guarantees: secrecy, integrity and mutual au-
thentication. The protocols for providing these guarantees are such that devices
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owned by different users need not trust each other. As such, WPA2 Enterprise
provides a strong and secure foundation for wireless communication within any
large organization.
A key requirement of WPA2 Enterprise is that supplicants be correctly con-
figured before connecting to the enterprise wireless network [12]. While the
exact meaning of correctly configured may depend on the specific environment,
a fundamental requirement is that the supplicant knows in advance the DNS
name of the authorization server of the enterprise network, that is, of the server
that validates the credentials exhibited by a supplicant during the authentica-
tion that must occur prior to connecting.
Satisfying this requirement is extremely important. Supplicants that are not
correctly configured, i.e., that do not know the DNS name of the authorization
server for the enterprise network, may be easily tricked into starting an execution
of the authentication protocol with an evil twin, a malicious access point that
broadcasts the SSID of the enterprise network (e.g., [16, 2, 8, 11, 7]). In most
configurations the protocol execution will fail, because the evil twin will not be
able to authenticate itself to the supplicant as required by WPA2 Enterprise.
However, even a failed execution may suffice to leak user credentials to the evil
twin—the supplicant may decide to abort execution when it is too late, i.e.,
after it has already sent credential material to the evil twin.
This fact is not a merely hypothetical risk. It has been recently showed in
[6] that by just wandering around for a few hours in regions not covered by a
wireless network one could collect 200 enterprise credentials—roughly 25% of
them in clear text and the remaining ones in hashed MS-CHAPv2 form, which
can generally be decrypted easily [1]. It was also showed that by remaining for
a few seconds at less than 35 meters from a specific (voluntary) target whose
wifi device is not configured correctly, there is a very good chance that you may
steal his/her enterprise credentials; even when he/she is sitting in a car with
close windows. We are thus facing a scenario with attacks that can be done
quickly, cheaply, everywhere outside of the enterprise, that do not require any
explicit action from the targeted user; attacks that deliver, if successful, the
enterprise credentials, either in the clear or in a format that may be attacked
offline with moderate effort. We emphasize that we are not concerned with
man-in-the-middle attacks (MITM), i.e., attacks in which the supplicant con-
nects to the Internet through a fraudulent access point. We are concerned with
attacks consisting in stealing network credentials by means of an execution of
the network authentication protocol: these attacks may occur in an few seconds
and without any involvement of the user, unlike MITM attacks.
What makes this issue particularly relevant and important is the combi-
nation of two factors: nowadays most enterprises are based on single sign on,
i.e., the same credentials that are used for authenticating to the wireless net-
work unlock access to all the services of the enterprise; and, virtually everyone
is equipped with a portable WiFi device (a smartphone) that is permanently
attempting to connect to known SSIDs.
In this work we aim at gaining some insights into whether users and tech-
nicians are really aware of these important and widespread risks. Anecdotal
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evidence and our own experience suggest that this is not the case. For this rea-
son, we conducted two extensive analyses: a survey among approximately 1000
users from many different institutions about how they configured their WiFi de-
vices for enterprise network access; and, a review of approximately 310 network
configuration guides made available by enterprise network administrators.
The results of our analyses, illustrated in the next sections, provide impor-
tant insights into the practical deployments of such a pervasive and fundamental
technology as WPA2. Perhaps most importantly, these results show that the
basic security assumption of WPA2 Enterprise “you are expected to configure
your device appropriately, otherwise you will still connect to an authenticated
access point but you might be connected with an attacker” is indeed violated
systematically and thus can no longer be considered realistic. This is an ex-
tremely important point to make, because the WiFi Alliance is defining a new
generation of secure protocols for wireless networking (WPA3) that will address
several shortcomings of the current WPA2 standard (e.g., the recently discov-
ered KRACK vulnerability [13]). The publicly available information on WPA3,
though, does not address the issue of supplicant configuration at all [5]. We are
thus incurring the risk of receiving a novel fundamental standard constructed
upon requirements that in many cases are not satisfied, thereby leading to prac-
tical deployments of the standard that in many cases will not be secure.
2 Survey of configuration practices
In order to gain insights into how users actually configure their wifi devices,
we circulated a survey in the eduroam user community. Eduroam is a roaming
access service provided by a number of research institutions [14]. It allows mem-
bers of participating institutions to obtain Internet connectivity at any other
participating institution. In 2016, eduroam provided over 2.6 billion authenti-
cations of roaming users in the same country and over 592 million cross-border
authentications1.
Focussing on eduroam is important for several reasons.
• Each user should connect to eduroam according to WPA2 Enterprise con-
figuration instructions specific to his/her home institution. Thus, the sur-
vey allowed collecting data about the practices followed at many different
organizations.
• Eduroam has developed an application available for all the major operat-
ing systems that allows users to configure their devices automatically, with
the configuration suitable for their home institution—eduroam-cat2. Thus,
the survey allowed collecting data about the actual behavior of users, i.e.,
whether they are able or willing to configure their devices autonomously,
or they resort to the tool for automatic configuration. We emphasize that
1https://www.eduroam.org/2017/03/07/2016-a-record-breaking-year-for-eduroam/
2https://cat.eduroam.org/
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usage of the tool ensures a secure configuration of the supplicant while
autonomous configuration does not.
• Eduroam is a federation of research institutions, thus their users may be
more willing to share details about their technical practices than corporate
environments.
Indeed, we are not aware of any similar survey regarding the practices actually
followed by users for configuring their WPA2 Enterprise supplicants (see also
below).
The survey consisted of a few non-technical questions to be answered on a
Google Form, available in Italian and in English. We used our personal contacts
as initial seed. We collected 1099 answers, of which 964 from users which had
connected at least one of their wifi devices to eduroam. In the following we will
consider only answers from these users. We submitted several questions sepa-
rately for smartphone, tablet, notebook and obtained answers for 2054 devices.
Users were from approximately 100 institutions in 20 countries (specifica-
tion of country and institution was optional). The distribution of users across
institutions is highly skewed, with only 4 institutions associated with more than
20 answers. The distribution across countries is skewed as well, with most an-
swers coming from Italy or from an unspecified location, but with the Italian
version of the form; we received 193 answers from 19 countries different from
Italy and 12 answers from an unspecified country with the English version of the
form. Although the user population is obviously not a statistically significant
sample of the full population, we believe the results are indeed relevant and
useful. The breakdown of users depending on their self-described role in the
respective institution is given in Figure 1. It can be seen that the population is
not concentrated on any specific role.
The key question was “how did you configure your device for connecting to
eduroam?”, which was formulated separately for smartphone, tablet and note-
book. The possible answers were:
1. “My device is automatically managed by my organization”;
2. “I have downloaded and installed the network profile of my organization”;
3. “I have played with configuration options until it worked”;
4. “A technician of my organization has configured my device for me”;
5. “I don’t know”.
Mapping from these answers to the security of the resulting configuration is
not automatic. We considered the possibility of defining different answers that
could have facilitated this mapping but quickly rejected this option: the num-
ber of possible answers would have been very large; the survey would have been
suitable only for skilled users; and, filling the form would have been quite cum-
bersome and time consuming. Thus, we preferred more general answers in order
to collect as many users as possible. Said this, we believe it is reasonable to
assume that:
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Figure 1: Role of users participating in the survey.
• categories 1 and 2 correspond to a secure configuration;
• categories 3 and 4 may or may not correspond to a secure configuration
(these two categories will be analyzed in more detail below)
The answers are summarized in Figure 2.
It can be seen that near half of the supplicants have been configured with the
network profile published by the respective organization. This result is certainly
highly positive from the point of view of the developers of the tool for automatic
configuration (eduroam-cat) but, in our opinion, is highly worrying: only half
of the supplicants are certainly configured securely. We believe that this result
is a very strong indication that the underlying hypothesis in WPA2 Enterprise
(i.e., that supplicants are configured correctly) is not realistic.
Concerning category 3 “I have played with configuration options until it
worked” (35.3% of devices), we have no elements for conclusively determining
whether the resulting configuration was secure or not. However, there are strong
signals suggesting that for many users this is not the case. Figure 3 summarizes
the answers to the question “do you know the name of the eduroam Authoriza-
tion Server of your organization?” given by users that have connected at least
one of their devices to eduroam. It can be seen that 76.6% of the users either do
not know that name or do not even know what an Authorization Server is. Al-
though knowledge of the name of the Authorization Server is, strictly speaking,
independent of the security of the resulting configuration, it seems reasonable
to assume that if users in these categories proceed with trial and error until
connecting, then the resulting supplicant configuration is unlikely to be secure.
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Figure 2: Configuration procedure followed by users. Number of answers for
each category of devices (up), percentage of answers all categories (down).
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Figure 3: Answers of users to the question ”do you know the name of the
correct authorization server for your network?”
Concerning, finally, category 4 “A technician of my organization has con-
figured my device for me” (9.9% of devices), it would be tempting to assume
that all these devices have been configured securely, but such an assumption is
probably excessively optimistic. To our surprise, we have found several eduroam
configuration guides published on the web that suggest insecure supplicant con-
figurations, the most frequent insecure suggestion being “do not validate server
certificate”. Thus, either technicians at those institutions are not fully aware of
the security risks, or choose to ignore those risks. In either case, one cannot take
for granted that a technician will configure a supplicant securely. In order to
gain more insights into this important issue, we have performed a more system-
atic analysis and reviewed a number of configuration guides, as explained in the
next section. Irrespective of the security of the resulting configuration, though,
the fact that less than 13% of users had the configuration either performed by
a technician or managed automatically, implies that supplicant configuration of
WiFi Enterprise networks should be designed with unskilled users in mind.
The previous data are relative to the whole set of devices. The corresponding
data for each of the three device categories—smartphone, tablet, notebook—
are given in Figure 4. These data provide an important insight: smartphones
are proportionally much more likely to be connected to eduroam than either
tablets or notebooks—the percentage of devices that have never been connected
to eduroam are 7.5%, 57% and 22.7%, respectively. This result confirms that
smartphones are a very attractive target for attackers, more so than either
tablets or notebooks: smartphones are more likely to contain enterprise creden-
tials; and, smartphones may be attacked by an evil twin everywhere outside of
the enterprise, without any need of requiring any specific action from the user.
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Another observation that can be made from Figure 4 is that the distribution
of configuration procedures for smartphones is roughly similar to the distribu-
tion for all devices (Figure 2), more so than in the case of either tablets or
notebooks. In particular, we remark than one third of users that connect their
smartphone to eduroam do so by playing with configuration options.
Our data confirm earlier analyses executed on a smaller and more localized
scale. An experiment in which the configuration of 507 devices of approximately
350 users in the same University was checked is reported in [7] (along with a more
detailed analysis of potential vulnerabilities in eduroam deployments, along with
suggestions for possible mitigations). The users were explicitly invited to par-
ticipate in an event for checking the configuration of their devices and had to go
to a room prepared for this purpose; thus, it is fair to assume that the involved
users were more technically informed and security-savvy than the average of
the entire user population. Furthermore, the event was organized five months
after updating the eduroam configuration guide and after distributing specific
leaflets. Despite these very favorable conditions, it turned out that 52% of the
devices were wrongly configured. A report summarizing a 4-year experience
of deploying WPA2 Enterprise in an University (not participating in eduroam)
reported that 43% of their students “do not use CA certificates to authenticate
the server” [15].
We cannot compare our results to data obtained in corporate environments,
as we could not find any such data. We are only aware of surveys in large US
companies focussing on policies for enterprise usage of personal devices (bring
your own device, BYOD): interestingly, half of the organizations that support
or mandate usage of personal devices do not have a formal policy for their usage
[3, 4]. Furthermore, half of the respondents to another similar survey use their
personal devices in the workplace even in organizations that explicitly ban the
use of those devices, or in the absence of any specific policy or without even
knowing whether such a policy exists [9]. These facts are a further proof of the
relevance of the issues that we are considering here, we believe.
3 Survey of configuration guides
We reviewed 311 configuration guides published on the web by 69 institutions
in 17 countries (each guide being for a specific supplicant operating system).
We are not aware of any similar analysis. The institutions are a subset of the
institutions found in the user survey of the previous section (we could not afford
to analyze all the institutions). We considered only configuration guides either
in English or in Italy.
We placed each guide into a single category, depending on whether the guide
contained any indication that could lead to an insecure supplicant configuration.
The categories are as follows:
Do not validate server certificate The guide specifies to uncheck the “val-
idate server certificate” option.
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Figure 4: Configuration procedure followed by users, separately for each device
category: smartphone (up), tablet (middle), notebook (down).
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No validation info The guide does not provide any information about the
need to validate the certificate, nor about the certificate itself.
Any certificate The guide specifies explicitly to accept any certificate.
No certificate info The guide specifies that a certificate has to be accepted,
but it does not provide any indication about the certificate itself (i.e.,
about which certificate should be accepted).
Incomplete certificate info The guide shows the server name (usually in im-
ages used for clarifying the idescription) but it does not specify that only
a certificate with that exact name should be accepted.
None The guide does not indicate any action that could lead to an insecure
configuration.
The distribution of guides by category is shown in Figure 5. It can be seen
that only 60% of the guides belong to category None, thus 40% of the guides
contain indications that could lead to an insecure configuration.
The risk levels of the chosen categories are different, thus one might claim
that not all the resulting configurations can be considered as being insecure. In
particular, the risk level for guides in categories “No certificate info” or “Incom-
plete certificate info” is arguably smaller than for guides in the other categories.
However, even if we consider guides in those categories as suggesting a partly
secure configuration, it is simple to realize from Figure 5 that these guides
would account for just 10% of all guides: the percentage of guides suggesting
an insecure supplicant configuration would still be around 30%.
To ascertain whether this result is an artifact of a few institutions publishing
many guides with questionable indications, we counted how many institutions
published only guides describing a secure configuration. We found that only 29
institutions published guides of this kind, while the remaining 40 institutions
published at least one guide leading to a configuration that is either insecure or
partly secure (in the meaning above). The vast majority of these institutions
(36 out of 40) published at least one insecure guide.
This result is a strong indication that, as claimed in the previous sections,
one cannot take for granted that a technician will configure a supplicant securely.
We believe this result is highly significant and constitute a further proof that
a fundamental security assumption in WPA2 Enterprise—supplicants must be
configured appropriately—is no longer realistic.
Of course, by no means we are implying that technicians that prepared the
guides in our analysis are not competent. We are merely describing the existing
scenario. There may be many reasons why a configuration guide indicates steps
that could lead to an insecure configuration, for example, the need of prioritizing
the effort of the (usually scarce) IT staff could have led to the decision of writing
configuration guides that are simpler for users to read and for technicians to
maintain, even at the expense of an increased risk, in exchange for more time to
devote to other activities for increasing the overall security of the organization.
Indeed, we are aware of several institutions of the eduroam federation that
10
Figure 5: Configuration guides by category.
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carefully configured their infrastructures so that supplicants may connect only
by using the network profile installed by the eduroam-cat application 3.
Finally, we observed that 47 of the 69 institutions make a network profile
available for downloading and usage with eduroam-cat. We could not identify
any significant signal linking the possibility of using eduroam-cat and the quality
of the configuration guides. Interestingly, we observed that those configuration
guides that mentioned eduroam-cat, tended to describe this tool as a mean
for simplifying the configuration; the fact that eduroam-cat allows obtaining a
secure configuration is mentioned much less frequently, if at all.
4 Conclusions
Techniques for attacking WPA2 Enterprise supplicants that are not configured
appropriately are widely known (e.g., [16, 2, 8, 11, 7]). These techniques are not
a weakness of the WPA2 Enterprise family of protocols: they are an obvious
consequence of using those protocols without satisfying their basic requirements.
The corresponding risks have become much more pervasive and significant than
they used to be, though, and it seems fair to claim than neither users nor techni-
cians have realized the magnitude of these risks. The world is now very different
from how it was when WPA2 Enterprise was defined, in 2004: today virtually
every user carries a WiFi-enabled personal device that attempts to connect to
known networks permanently and automatically, without any explicit action
from the user; what is worse, such devices often connect by using credentials
that unlock access to all services of an enterprise. The combination of these two
factors makes attacks aimed at stealing enterprise credentials from smartphones
extremely attractive [6].
In this work we conducted two extensive analyses aimed at assessing how
pervasive the corresponding risks are. A survey among approximately 1000 users
from many different institutions and a review of approximately 310 network
configuration guides. We are not aware of any similar study. Our analyses
provide important insights into the practical deployments of such a pervasive
and fundamental technology as WPA2 and strongly suggest that a requirement
fundamental for enjoying the security guarantees of WPA2 Enterprise is not
satisfied in a very large amount of deployments.
We hope that our results will help in disseminating awareness of the risks
associated with insecure configuration of WPA2 Enterprise supplicants and in
promoting more secure usage and configuration practices. We also hope that
our results will be taken into account by the WiFi Alliance for defining the new
family of wireless protocols WPA3.
3This property is obtained by a smart exploitation of the fact that WPA2 Enterprise pro-
tocols allow using two different identities during an execution of the authentication protocol;
these infrastructures are configured to require an outer-identity identical for all users, hard-
coded within the network profile of eduroam-cat and unlikely to be guessed by trial and error;
and an inner-identity specific for each user.
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